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ABSTRACT 
Public Administration is in an era of change. This paper studies one under-researched part of 
public administration, the executive arms of International Governmental Organizations 
(IGOs). These are referred to as International Executives (IEs) and provide a conceptual 
mapping and empirical illustrations of three important dynamics of IEs – intergovernmental, 
supranational and transgovernmental dynamics. The paper offers a middle-range organization 
theory perspective that suggests five independent variables that affect the behavior and roles 
of IE civil servants. The variables are (i) the organizational properties of IEs, (ii) the degrees 
of institutionalization of IEs, (iii) the recruitment procedures of the IEs, (iv) characteristics of 
the relationships between IEs and external institutions, and finally (v) demographic 
characteristics of the IE civil servants. The empirical illustrations are drawn from the 
European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat. The paper highlights 
that the IEs of the EU, the OECD and the WTO seem to share important behavioral dynamics 
due to organizational similarities. 
 
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVES1 
Public Administration is in an era of change (Aberback 2003). Apparently, executive 
functions, like rule-making and norm-setting, are increasingly transported from national 
executives to International Governmental Organizations (IGOs).2 This paper studies one 
under-researched aspect of IGOs - International Executives (IEs) - and particularly the factors 
that impact on the behavior and role perceptions of IE incumbents. The question targeted is to 
what extent, how and why IEs challenge the existing Westphalian normative nation-state 
order based on territorial sovereignty (Gourevitch 2003; Kegley and Raymond 2002, 192; 
March and Olsen 1998; Rosenau 1996). To answer this question a middle-range organization 
theory perspective is outlined specifying the conditions under which IE officials evoke 
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different role perceptions and behavioral patterns. The empirical illustrations are drawn from 
the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat – the main 
executive bodies of the three respective organizations (EU, OECD, WTO). The paper hereby 
challenges claims like “comparing the Commission with international secretariats…would 
certainly be of very limited usefulness...” (Christiansen 1996, 77). 
 
Evidently, the international political scene has become increasingly organized in the WWII 
period, reflected in the upsurge, institutionalization and impact of IGOs (Finnemore1996; 
March and Olsen 1998). However, there is a surprising dearth of theoretically informed 
empirical studies of the internal dynamics of IGOs (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Checkel 
2003; Gehring 2003, 4; Gould and Kelman 1970; Johnston 2003; Mouritzen 1990; Rochester 
1986). Two main bodies of literature have combined theoretical innovation and empirical 
testing of IGO dynamics. The first strand of research was the functionalist and neo-
functionalist studies of the EU and the UN, inspired by Ernst Haas (e.g. Alger 1963; Ernst 
1978; Wolf 1973). The second body of research is the more recent institutionalist and social 
constructivist literature on organizations like the EU, the Council of Europe and NATO (e.g. 
Checkel 2003; Zürn 2003). Neither of these endeavors has systematically studied on the 
executive arms of IGOs. Nor have these bodies of literature emphasized the relationships 
between generic organizational properties of IEs and IE dynamics (Kratochwil and Ruggie 
1986, 761). This paper argues that IEs are the centers of gravity of most contemporary IGOs. 
The paper also advocates that the internal dynamics of IEs are conditioned by their 
organizational components, degrees of institutionalization, recruitment procedures, 
relationship with external institutions, and demographic compositions of the personnel. These 
organizational characteristics ultimately impact on the IE incumbents’ behavioral patterns and 
role perceptions.  
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Whereas some picture the nation-state as weakened, hollowed out and fragmented due to the 
advent of IGOs (e.g. Rosenau 1997), others argue that the nation-state is strengthened and 
increasingly integrated as a coherent Westphalian system of territorial sovereignty (e.g. 
Biersteker 2003; Moravcsik 1998). Moreover, whereas some picture IGOs as key motor in the 
transformation of nation-state institutions (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Wessels, 
Maurer and Mittag 2003), others conclude that the effects of IGOs are moderate and 
associated with existing dynamics of domestic change (Anderson 2002; Olsen 2003a). Such 
conflicting assessments represent more than standard academic turf-battles with regard to 
institutional transformations of political orders. We are facing complex, puzzling and poorly 
understood relationships between IGOs and domestic transformation (Bulmer and Burch 
1998).3 The question posed here is whether the IEs of IGOs are merely instruments for 
member states or whether they are best conceived as transformative institutions contributing 
to supranational and transgovernmental governance. 
 
Much recent literature assumes that the European Commission represents a critical case of 
transformation: If we do not observe transformational dynamics within the Commission we 
should not expect similar dynamics within other IGOs (Johnston 2003). This assumption is 
challenged by advocating that IGOs are multi-dimensional organizations, embodying 
contradictions and dilemmas that are difficult to solve and that affect how decisions are made. 
IGOs are seldom one-dimensional as suggested by realist and neo-liberalist theoretical 
orthodoxy, stressing the intergovernmental aspects of IGOs. This paper challenges this 
theoretical orthodoxy by unpacking the organizational characteristics and dynamics of IEs. 
IEs are not merely neutral tools used by member governments of IGOs; they are also 
epistemic communities of professional experts and socializing agents of community minded 
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elites (Checkel 2003; Haas 1992). IEs are multi-dimensional organizations that should be 
analyzed by fine-grained operational accounts to understand their diverse modus operandi. 
They live with in-build tensions between at least three operational logics: 
intergovernmentalism, supranationalism and transgovernmentalism. Accordingly, IEs are 
partly vehicles of nation-state preferences, partly autonomous supranational institutions with 
vested interests, visions and drives, and partly porous and segmented professional institutions 
where knowledge is discovered, developed, interpreted and spread. This paper theorizes the 
conditions under which incumbents of IEs evoke intergovernmental, supranational and 
transgovernmental behavior and role perceptions.  
 
The study of transformational change is important in times of change because these are 
periods when institutional dynamics are created and periods when they are easily observed 
(Rosenau 1997). Transformational change refers to significant changes in organizational 
structures, constitutive institutional principles, actual decision-making processes and/or 
collective and individual preferences, norms, identities and roles (March and Olsen 1998; 
Ruggie 1998, 874). The focus of this paper is on the end-point of actor transformation, not on 
the process of it (Alderson 2001). Arguably, actor transformation implies that IE officials 
evoke supranational and/or transgovernmental behavior and roles (Greenwood and Hinings 
1996). It is also assumed a mutual relationship between these components: Acting in certain 
ways make actors better equipped to play particular roles, and by playing these roles the actor 
may over time take them for granted. Moreover, taken for granted roles may affect the roles 
that are played and the behavior evoked. Actors are strongly transformed if they activate 
supranational and transgovernmental ways of behavior and role perceptions in a more or less 
routinized fashion (Beyers and Trondal 2004; Zürn 2003). In sum, actor transformation 
implies that the roles and behavior evoked by IE civil servants are less biased by their country 
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of origin than by supranational and professional affiliations, respectively. They become less 
focused on defending fixed national positions than by discovering and pursuing what is 
perceived as the ‘common good’ (supranational role) and scientifically correct 
(functional/transgovernmental role), respectively.  
 
The paper is sequenced as follows: The next section outlines a middle-range organization 
theory approach that suggests five generic variables that affect civil servants’ decision-making 
behavior and role perceptions. The next section provides empirical observations of the 
behavior and roles evoked by civil servants of the European Commission, the OECD 
Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat. The discussion concludes that the mix of behavioral and 
role dynamics within the IEs are organizationally contingent and more complex than assumed 
by IR theoretical orthodoxy. IE officials are expected to perform increasingly more complex 
tasks of representation. The paper highlights that the IEs of the EU, the OECD and the WTO 
seem to share important behavioral dynamics due to organizational similarities.  
 
A MIDDLE-RANGE ORGANIZATION THEORY APPROACH 
This paper departs from a three-fold conceptualization of IGos as intergovernmental, 
transgovernmental and supranational (Simmons and Martin 2003). According to this 
conceptualization, IEs may differ as far as their degree of institutional autonomy and unity are 
concerned, and depending on the type of IGOs they operate within. Traditional 
intergovernmental organizations score low on both items by being non-unitary organizations 
constructed by nation-states and without the authorization to issue binding decisions that go 
against one or several member-states. Intergovernmental organizations uphold the territorial 
logic of the Westphalian order at the international level by a territorial principle of 
organization. Supranational organizations, by contrast, score high on both items by being 
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unitary organizations with autonomous spheres of sovereignty. These organizations challenge 
the territorial logic of nation-state sovereignty by having acquired spheres of institutional 
autonomy (Cortell and Peterson 2003; Egeberg 2003b). Finally, transgovernmental 
organizations challenge the principle of institutional unity by being functionally de-coupled, 
porous and open organizations, composed of government actors from different fractions and 
levels of government – i.e. domestic sector ministries and agencies. Transgovernmental 
organizations have shared institutional jurisdictions with other constituencies, and are 
internally marked by functional patterns of co-operation and conflict (Rosenau 1997).  
 
This three-fold conceptual map may be transposed into a corresponding conceptual map of the 
behavior and role perceptions evoked by IE officials. National roles focus on territorial 
sovereignty and statehood, supranational roles emphasize the institutional autonomy of IEs, 
whereas transgovernmental roles emphasis functional and professional interests, norms and 
rules (Aggestam 1999). According to the organization theory approach outlined here different 
mixes of this role repertoire are activated and de-activated under different organizational 
conditions.  
 
Most students of IGOs have adopted neo-liberalist and realist approaches. Central questions in 
these approaches are why nation-states establish IGOs and how they contribute to safeguard 
nation-state preferences. Answers to both questions rest on cost-benefit rationalist analyses 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1996). Recent studies of IGOs have made an 
‘institutionalist turn’ and rediscovered questions of actor socialization, complex learning and 
cognitive framing of norms and rules (Checkel 2003; Trondal 2001). IGOs are pictured as 
more than empty vessels and neutral arenas in which state representatives gather (Finnemore 
1996, 35). An equivalent rediscovery of institutions was made in the field of organization 
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theory twenty years ago (March and Olsen 1984). The independent variables outlined beneath 
thus benefit from past theoretical discoveries. One additional criterion for selecting the 
independent variables has been how successfully they have survived past empirical tests. 
 
Formal organizations provide a codified and normative embodiment of their incumbents. In 
order to understand the process whereby actors adopt particular behavior and roles one has to 
unpack the normative structures surrounding them. Actors are bounded rational with limited 
computational abilities. Formal organizations provide cognitive and normative shortcuts and 
categories that simplify and guide actors’ choice of selected parts of their behavioral and role 
repertoire (Simon 1975). Organizations provide cognitive maps that simplify and categorize 
complex information, offer procedures for reducing transaction cost, give regulative norms 
that add cues for appropriate behavior as well as physical boundaries and temporal rhythms 
that guide actors’ perception of relevance with respect to behavior and role (Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999; March and Olsen 1998). Similarly, the international society has been 
portrayed “as a community of rule followers and role players…” (March and Olsen 1998, 
952).  
 
Five organizational variables are outlined in the following, specifying conditions under which 
IE officials are likely to adopt supranational and transgovernmental behavior and roles in a 
more or less routinised way (Zürn 2003). Figure 1 reveals how these variables play out in our 
selected cases: the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat:  
 
-- Figure 1 about here – 
 
Organizational properties 
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The first independent variable considered is the properties of organizations. Formal 
organizations are normative structures “composed of rules and roles specifying, more or less 
clearly, who is expected to do what, and how” (Egeberg 2003a, 117). Executive organizations 
are organized horizontally and vertically. Two important horizontal principles of executive 
organization are sector/purpose, function and territory (Gulick 1937). Already Robert W. Cox 
and Harold K. Jacobson (1973) saw the organizational similarities between national 
bureaucracies and IEs. Most executive organizations, both domestic and international, are 
organized according to the principles of purpose and function. The argument here is that IEs 
organized by purpose and function are likely to accompany decision-making behavior and 
role perceptions that are functionally defined and less biased by territoriality. Hence, the 
territorial principle of Westphalia is transcended by a functional logic. 
  
IEs cover different policy sectors. This paper focuses on the trade sector and the research 
sector - two internationally oriented policy domains. Both sectors are covered by the EU, the 
OECD and the WTO, and interwoven by alleged contribution to increased trade and economic 
prosperity (European Commission 2000). Both sectors have also been increasingly subject to 
regulations and normative standardization from domestic governments and from IGOs such as 
the EU, OECD and WTO (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000; Finnemore 1996; Woolcock 2000).  
 
One observation in previous research is that actors’ roles are transformed more easily in 
highly issue-specific situations (Zürn 2003, 20). Arguably, the stronger degrees of horizontal 
specialization by purpose and function the more exclusive competences are needed to 
effectively act within it. Hence, actors are likely to be granted a greater amount of leeway and 
autonomy in horizontally specialized organizations. Sector specialization may accompany the 
emergence of epistemic communities of experts who have shared understandings of causal 
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relationships between means and ends, worldviews, roles and norms of appropriate behavior. 
Moreover, such expert communities are less bound to territorial borders, and often loosely 
tied to particular organizations (Haas 1992). Participants in such networks often have life-long 
commitments and careers attached to them, accompanying the emergence of 
transgovernmental expert roles among such officials (Haas 1990, 42; Hasenclever, Mayer and 
Rittberger 1996, 209). This argument implies that the WTO Secretariat, the OECD Secretariat 
and the European Commission all have socializing power on incumbents due to their 
horizontal issue-specificity. Furthermore, it also implies that DG Trade and DG Research of 
the European Commission have stronger socializing power on Commission officials than the 
European Commission as a whole, and that the specialized divisions of the WTO and OECD 
secretariats have stronger socializing power than the secretariats as such. Hence, officials of 
IEs are likely to activate behavior and role perceptions that reflect their specialized affiliations 
more strongly than their more general affiliations to the IEs.  
 
Vertically, executive bodies are typically organized according to a specialized structure of 
rank. The argument suggested here is that vertically specialized IEs have the potential for 
disciplining and controlling civil servants by hierarchy (Egeberg 2003a). Hence, vertically 
specialized IEs are likely to have stronger impact on incumbents’ behaviour and role 
perceptions than less vertically specialized IEs (Bennett and Oliver 2002, 425; Egeberg 
2003c, 137; Knight 1970). The European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO 
Secretariat vertically organized IEs. In sum, vertically specialized IEs and IEs organized by 
purpose and function are conducive to supranational and transgovernmental behavioral 
dynamics among the personnel. 
 
Institutionalization 
CES – Working paper no. 2, 2004 
 
11
The second independent variable analyzed is the degrees of institutionalization of IEs. 
Organization and institution should not be conflated. The institutionalization of formal 
organizations, whereby they become “infused with value…” strengthens their ability to 
impact on incumbents’ behavior and role perceptions (Selznick 1957, 17). “To be reckoned as 
‘institution’, organizations should have a distinctive identity and a value in their own right” 
(Egeberg 2003b, 7). An institution develops its own distinct dynamic (Cox and Jacobson 
1973:7). Generally, institutionalized organizations have the ability to socialize incumbents 
towards an embodiment of purpose. However, most civil servants of IEs have multiple 
institutional affiliations – some primary and some secondary to them (see below). The 
primary affiliation of IE officials is the IE as such – and the departments and units underneath 
- while their secondary affiliations may be domestic government institutions – like ministries 
and agencies from their country of origin – or professional institutions. Arguably, the stronger 
the institutionalization of primary institutions, the weaker the transformative power of 
secondary (external) institutions, notwithstanding the latter’s level of institutionalization. In 
accordance with this argument, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, 893) argue 
that the influence of domestic (secondary) institutions is reduced as the organizational 
structures of IEs become institutionalized.  
 
Recruitment procedure 
Organizational autonomy is strongly dependent on their recruitment procedures because 
different procedures for recruitment are likely to affect actors’ decision-making behavior and 
role perceptions differently (Mouritzen 1990, 39). Recruitment may be based on a merit 
principle, as in most Western democracies, and on a quota principle or other systems of 
patronage or parachutage, as in the top echelon of the American civil service (Ingraham 
1995, 9). Whereas the merit principle recruits neutral, permanent civil servants on the basis of 
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competence, the quota principle typically recruits officials on more temporary contracts on the 
basis of, for example, political, sectoral or territorial loyalties (Bekke and van der Meer 2000, 
281-282; Ingraham 1995, xix). The argument forwarded here is that, ceteris paribus, the merit 
principle applied to IEs foster supranational and transgovernmental roles and behavior more 
efficiently than the quota principle because there is no inherent territorial logic in the former 
principle (Bennett and Oliver 2002, 418). The national connection is upheld under the quota 
principle securing a staff loyal to the domestic constituency. Intergovernmental organizations 
have typically employed the quota principle and different systems of secondment in order to 
uphold geographical balances of posts, like in the NATO Secretariat and the UN Secretariat 
(Bennett and Oliver 2002, 413; Mouritzen 1990; Reymond and Mailick 1986). The merit 
principle is central to the European Commission as well as to the WTO Secretariat. This 
principle secures institutional autonomy as far as recruitment to the IE is concerned and 
henceforth non-territorial loyalties among the incumbents. The quota principle is more central 
in the OECD Secretariat (see below). 
 
Studying officials in IEs implies studying officials who mostly have worked in national 
institutions prior to entering the IEs. This is particularly the case among a segment of the 
European Commission hired on short-term contracts. The WTO does not employ seconded 
personnel to the same extent as the European Commission. In the WTO, permanent positions 
are the rule. Officials are recruited on the basis of merit, and the personnel tend to stay 
employed in the WTO once they have entered. In the OECD, a large and increasing part of the 
employees are ‘seconded’ consultants and researchers. Furthermore, in the OECD apparatus 
the term ‘permanent’ has lost its significance since 70-80 percent is employed on time-limited 
contracts. The whole OECD secretariat may thus be considered a parallel administration 
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(Marcussen 2002). Assumable, seconded officials become less supranationally oriented than 
the permanent IE civil servants. 
 
Organizational affiliations 
The fourth independent variable is the characteristics of the relationships that may develop 
between organizations. Both rationalist and cognitive theories of IGOs “have been rather 
silent on the role of domestic factors” (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1996, 221). IEs 
serve as parts of complex webs of organizations, including other IEs, member-state 
institutions, private organizations, etc. Different IEs may have institutionalized relationships 
because of overlapping jurisdictions, overlapping members, and histories of co-operation 
(Cox and Jacobsson 1973, 382; Haas 1990, 27). Civil servants of IEs have typically multiple 
institutional affiliations - both nationally and internationally – that pose multiple cognitive 
frames, incentives and norms of appropriate conduct (March and Olsen 1998). We assume 
that the behavior and role perceptions of IE civil servants are a product of their primary (IE) 
and secondary (external) organizational affiliations. Hence, there is a hierarchy of 
organizational memberships present (Flora 1999, 35). The demands that these affiliations pose 
may conflict thereby inducing role and behavioral conflicts among the officials (Barnett 
1993). The status of primary and secondary affiliations is measured here by the length and 
intensity of affiliation to each of them. For example, most Commission officials as well as 
officials of the WTO Secretariat use a majority of their time and energy within their DG and 
Unit (European Commission) or specialized divisions (WTO Secretariat), and less towards 
other institutions. This implies that their IE portfolios govern their behavior and roles 
perceptions more strongly than external organizations. One effect of intensive and long tenure 
within IEs is that these institutions become “real” in a social psychological sense to the 
officials. Both students of EU institutions and students of mass opinion conclude that actors 
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tend to develop multiple identities, and that supranational, national and professional identities 
supplement each other. Different roles are activated in different situations, and they become 
partly meshed and blended into each other over time (Lewis 2000; Risse and Maier 2003; 
Trondal 2004).  
 
There is an inbuilt tension between a logic of recency and a logic of primacy. Whereas the 
logic of recency implies that recently evoked roles and behavior are likely to be evoked again 
(March 1994, 70), the logic of primacy (see the above paragraph) entails that roles and 
behavior that are evoked within primary institutions are likely to be enacted in secondary 
institutions as well. Arguably, the logic of recency may trump the logic of primacy if actors 
engage for long time and interact intensively within secondary (external) institutions. The 
logic of recency is also likely to affect actors’ behavior and role if the size of the temporal gap 
between primary and secondary affiliation is sufficient. Hence, the amount of time spent in 
the secondary institution, and the amount of time passing between occupation in the primary 
and the secondary institution may condition the relative importance of the logic of recency 
and the logic of primacy (Johnston 2003, 9). Consequently, permanent IE officials are likely 
to be affected by a logic of primacy whereas IE officials on temporary contracts are more 
likely to act on the premises of a logic of recency.  
 
The logic of primacy is also conditioned by the degree of organizational fit or mis-fit between 
primary and secondary institutions (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001). “[I]nstitutions have 
non-synchronized dynamics” (Olsen 2003b, 18). Our argument is that the greater the degree 
of organizational mis-fit, the more likely that the logic of primacy is acted upon. For example, 
the territorial logic of nation-state foreign policy easily conflict with the sectoral logic of the 
Commission’s research policy. The logic of primacy assumes that Commission officials, 
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affiliated to DG Research, think and behave according to their DG portfolio more than 
according to their country of origin. Likewise, long-time employees of the WTO Secretariat 
are expected to think and behave according to their Division’s portfolio more than according 
to their country of origin or other institutional affiliations. Organizational fit is more likely to 
activate a logic of recency which entails moderate transformation of behavior and role.  
 
One proxy of organizational fit is the principles of horizontal organization of primary and 
secondary organizations (sector versus territory) (Gulick 1937). Stein Rokkan (1987, 212) 
argued that political institutions are often two-dimensional, organized along one territorial and 
one functional axis. One central organizing principle of the General Assemblies of IGOs is 
their territorial organization of political geography, mirroring the spatial structuring of state 
sovereignty. In contrast, the organization of IEs mirrors the sectoral and process organization 
of most domestic executives (see above). The argument is that organizational mis-fit, for 
example between a sectoral and a territorial axis if you will, is likely to challenge existing 
ways of acting and thinking among the civil servants (Egeberg 2003a). For example, civil 
servants who were previously affiliated to domestic sector ministries (like a research ministry) 
are challenged when entering an IGO organized by territory – like the WTO and OECD 
general assemblies and committee systems.  
       
Finally, the logic of primacy is conditioned by the properties of actor interaction. Actors may 
have dense, moderate or low interaction across organizational tiers. Interaction may also be 
formalized or based on informal codes of conduct. Role-change often follows from long-term 
and informal interaction (Hopf 2002, 5; Lewis 2003; Olsen 2003b,18). However, empirical 
studies of IE participants challenge the assumption that length of participation among IE 
officials accompanies a re-socialization of them (e.g. Ernst 1978; Trondal 2001). On the other 
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hand, transactionalists and functionalists have argued that intensive and face-to-face 
interaction between state agents lead to the development of common identities and roles, and 
a shift towards a greater alignment with the IGO (Deutsch 1957). Internalization and the 
social learning of roles and behavior occur through intensive repetition of role and action. 
Direct experiences of IEs increase the likelihood that civil servants evoke roles and behavior 
consistent with shared norms and values of the IEs (the logic of primacy). Jean Monnet 
believed that “men are changed by what they do” (quoted in Duchène 1994, 376). 
 
There may be clear and less clear boundary policing between organizations (Johnston 2003). 
Actor interaction across organizational boundaries affects their perceptions of the 
permeability of these borders. For example, Commission officials may have intensive contacts 
with domestic officials as well as OECD and WTO officials who work on similar issues. The 
argument is that boundaries that are perceived as unclear invoke ambiguous cues for action 
and role enactment. In such circumstances the logic of recency is likely to be guiding actors’ 
roles and behavior. On the other hand, the clearer the perceived boundaries between IEs and 
other institutions, the more likely that the logic of primacy is evoked.  
 
Demographic characteristics 
Finally, organizations are composed of actors with demographic characteristics (e.g. 
education, tenure, age and nationality) that may guide actors’ enactment of behavior and role 
perception. Ceteris paribus, highly educated civil servants within expert organizations are 
more likely to evoke roles as independent sector experts than roles as national representatives 
(Cortell and Peterson 2003, 6). Moreover, IE officials with an international education and 
with a multinational family background are more likely to be supranationally oriented than 
officials with a national education and family. This is due to their parental and educational 
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pre-socialization prior to entering the IEs. Ceteris paribus, young IE civil servants are more 
likely to become supranationally and transgovernmentally oriented than older civil servants 
who have been subject to domestic pre-socialization over longer periods of time. Finally, the 
tenure of civil servants is likely to mould their decision-making behavior. Arguably, senior IE 
officials with life-long service are more likely to evoke supranational and transgovernmental 
behavior and roles than newly recruited IEs officials (Mourtizen 1990, 44). Loyalty towards 
any IE is assumed to be a function of the IE officials’ length of service (cf. recruitment 
procedures) 
 
A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
The analysis benefits from comparing how the five independent variables affect the role and 
behavior of IE personnel in three IEs. A systematic and critical test of the five independent 
variables warrants empirical data not yet available. There is a lack of empirical research on 
how IEs affect the behavior and roles of their incumbents. Hence, the next section does not 
give a systematic variable-by-variable test. The following discussion is empirically suggestive 
and illustrative, and benefits from secondary empirical material on seconded officials from 
different EU member-states and Norway (CLENAD 2003; EFTA Secretariat 2000; Smith 
1973; Smith 2001; Statskontoret 2001, 17). These data are supplemented by primary 
empirical observations from one research project on OECD officials (Marcussen 2002) and 
one research project on national civil servants attending EU committees – the Commission 
expert committees, the comitology committees and the Council working groups (Egeberg, 
Schaefer and Trondal 2003).  
  
EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
The European Commission 
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The European Commission, located in Brussels, is the core executive body at the heart of the 
EU. It houses about 20 000 officials, is vertically specialized into eight grades and headed by 
a collegium of Commissioners, and it is horizontally specialized according to purpose and 
function into 23 semi-autonomous Directorate Generals (DGs), a number of internal and 
general services, and several hundred Units. In several regards the Commission mirrors the 
functional and process organization of national executive bodies (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; 
Stevens and Stevens 2001, 166).  
 
Despite the existence of several competing dynamics within the Commission, balancing 
between institutional autonomy and dependence on the member-states (Christiansen 1997), 
this institution exhibits a strong supranational and transgovernmental modus operandi. 
Previous studies have indicated an integral supranational identity among Commissioners and 
top Commission bureaucrats. However, more intergovernmental dynamics strive constantly 
for attention (Hooghe 2001; Kassim and Menon 2004). Intergovernmental dynamics reflect 
partly the national origins of the Commission officials and partly elements of territorial 
organization within the Commission services, primarily at the Commissioner and Cabinet 
levels (Egeberg 2003c; Egeberg and Trondal 1999). By contrast, transgovernmental dynamics 
reflect the functional organization of the Commission DGs and Units and the professional 
expertise of the officials. 
 
The role perceptions and decision-making behavior of Commission officials is also accounted 
for by considering their sectoral Commission portfolios (Nugent 2001). Functional roles and 
behavioral patterns in the Commission are also due to close interaction with sectorally 
organized institutions outside the Commission, such as domestic sector ministries, industry 
and interest organizations. Moreover, Morten Egeberg (2003b) argues that sector roles and 
CES – Working paper no. 2, 2004 
 
19
decision-making behavior among Commission officials reflect their recruitment to the 
Commission. He shows that top Commission officials are recruited on the basis of merit and 
not on the basis of national flags, accompanying sectoral behavior that is closely linked to 
their Commission portfolio. Moreover, a meritocratic system is recently enhanced in the Staff 
Regulations with respect to internal promotion (Coull and Lewis 2003). However, the merit 
principle is indeed challenged by recent and current enlargements of the Union (Kassim and 
Menon 2004, 19; Stevens and Stevens 2001, 95). Upholding a geographical balance of A-
grade civil servants through secondment contracts may serve the purpose of upholding 
national allegiances among top Commission officials.  
 
Studies show that the horizontal specialization of IEs affects the role perceptions of the 
incumbents (e.g. Bennet and Oliver 2002, 426). In the Commission the DG and Unit level are 
important carriers of identification and decision-making premises (Cini 1996; McDonald 
1997). Decision-making within DG Trade is done by relatively small groups of policy experts 
(Woolcock 2000, 394). Intensive in-group interaction is conducive to the emergence of in-
group identifications, as was the case within Monnet’s own circle of advisors (Duchêne 
1994). Similarly, Michelle Cini (1997, 86) observes that the identities of the statuary staff of 
former DG Competition and Environment are directed more towards the DG level than 
towards the Commission at large. Hence, the horizontal organization of the Commission 
affects the role perceptions of the incumbents. However, the Commission also exhibit 
intergovernmental logics. Egeberg (1996) shows that national allegiances are strongly 
emphasized by seconded Commission officials. These allegiances may be accounted for by 
considering their non-merit based recruitment to the Commission services (Hooghe 2001).  
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There is one under-researched ‘Cinderella’ of the European Commission where 
intergovernmental dynamics have ample chances of survival and viability: the parallel 
administration of seconded national civil servants. Arguably, the emergence of supranational 
and transgovernmental behavior and roles among seconded Commission officials is indicative 
of the socializing power of the Commission writ large (Wolf 1973, 365). According to the 
White Paper on European Governance issued by the Commission in 2001, “exchange of staff 
and joint training between administrations at various levels would contribute to a better 
knowledge of each other’s policy objectives, working methods and instruments” (European 
Commission 2001, 13). This parallel administration was of paramount importance in the 
formative years of the Commission and will be extended substantially with the EU 
enlargement in May 2004. The Commission has estimated a need of about 4000 new recruits 
from the East European candidate countries, mostly hired to non-permanent posts (Trondal 
2004). 
 
Seconded national civil servants are heavily “pre-packed” and pre-socialized when entering 
the Commission. Their stay at the Commission is relatively short and the majority returns to 
prior positions in national ministries or agencies when their temporary contracts come to an 
end. Seconded personnel also remain paid by their employer at the national level when 
working for this supranational executive (CLENAD 2003; Statskontoret 2001). Consequently, 
the Commission should be considered a secondary institution to most secondêes. One should 
therefore expect these officials to be reluctant Europeans and hesitant to enact supranational 
roles while working for the Commission (cf. Lewis 2003). 
 
An early study of 36 former seconded Dutch officials to the Commission revealed that all of 
them retained a national loyalty when working in the Commission and “none indicated that 
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[they] had ever come into conflict of loyalty” (Smith 1973, 565). A study of seconded 
officials from the Scottish Office of the UK central administration to the European 
Commission supports these arguments (Smith 2001). James Smith (2001) also observes that 
seconded officials reinforce their national administrative cultures and allegiances rather than 
becoming more supranationally oriented during their stay at the Commission. Similarly, 
studies of EU committees demonstrate that national officials attending EU committees evoke 
national roles more strongly than supranational and transgovernmental roles (Egeberg, 
Schaefer and Trondal 2003). However, supranational allegiances are strengthened subsequent 
to intensive interaction within EU institutions (Trondal 2003). However, studies also indicate 
that supranational and transgovernmental roles among seconded Commission officials reflect 
a pre-socialization dynamic at the domestic level prior to entering the Commission (Page 
1997, 60). 
 
According to Cini (1996, 121), “the appointment of temporary staff encourages an 
intermingling of national and European administrators which itself has the potential to 
provoke a sort of process of Europeanisation at the national and sub-national levels”. 
Moreover, seconded Commission officials are sector experts who work in highly sector-
specialized task roles within their respective DGs. Moreover, these roles fit well-known roles 
from national ministries and agencies. According to a survey conducted by the EFTA 
Secretariat (2000, 1) among 18 Norwegian national experts to the Commission, “all but one 
had been working in the same unit during their contract period”.  These factors help explain 
why seconded Commission officials retain sectoralized roles and develop transgovernmental 
role perceptions and modes of action. 
 
The OECD Secretariat 
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The OECD was established in Paris on 30 September 1961. It included eighteen European 
countries, United States and Canada and replaced the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, which administered the US-funded Marshall aid to European reconstruction. 
The official purpose of the OECD is to assure growth and employment in member as well as 
non-member countries while maintaining financial stability. In order to reach this goal, the 
organization consistently works for trade and capital liberalization worldwide. Another major 
goal is the coordination of economic aid to developing countries. 
 
By 2003 the OECD has thirty members and its activity areas have gradually spread to include 
almost all aspects of relevance for economic, political and social governance in the member 
countries. This variety of activity areas is being dealt with in the over 200 committees and 
groups that provide the forums for informational exchange between national civil servants. 
Some committees like the Economic and Development Review Committee convene at least 
on a monthly basis. Others only rarely convene. Committees like the Economic Policy 
Committee and Working Party no.3 call together very senior civil servants from the member 
states. Others have a more loose composition, which varies from meeting to meeting. 
 
The work in the committees is supported logistically and analytically by the OECD 
secretariat, which employs about 800 academic staff to which one should add no less than 500 
employed on an ad-hoc basis. A number of these short-term and project employed 
professionals are consultants paid by their member state. To these numbers, one should add 
1.000 in other staff categories. The secretarial structure is a copy of the ministerial structure 
known from the member states. It is horizontally organized into 11 issue-specific directorates, 
including directorates that deal with science and trade. The Economics Department is by far 
the largest directorate, both with regard to finances and personnel. Attached are also semi-
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autonomous bodies such as the International Energy Agency. The Secretary General outlines 
the main objectives and strategies of the OECD and is also in charge of the daily secretarial 
business. The work of the secretariat results in a large number of analytical and statistical 
publications. 
 
OECD does not produce hard law that is directly applicable in the member countries, such as 
the European Union. Nor does it dispense money like for instance the International Monetary 
Fund. The OECD is best known for its production of comparable data and analyses. One 
could argue that the main purpose of the OECD, its independent status and its highly skilled 
secretariat is to function as an ideational artist. In that capacity the OECD was supposed to 
think the unthinkable and to play around with new and challenging concepts. With a view to 
improve the general macro-economic and political climate in the member countries, the 
OECD was also supposed to form a forum in which national high level representatives could 
enter into constructive dialogue. In that capacity the OECD should act as an ideational 
arbitrator that helps initiate a common learning process in the national public administrations. 
Consequently, the OECD today welcomes more than 40.000 national civil servants in its 
committees on an annual basis, thereby allowing for direct policy deliberation with a view to 
developing a common scheme of reference across national boundaries. Through moral 
suasion and continuous multilateral surveillance OECD civil servants as well as the large 
number of civil servants seconded from the member states evoke transgovernmental and 
supranational roles and identities (Marcussen 2002).  
 
It has been argued that the OECD to a large extent acts as a trend-follower rather than a trend-
setter. Consequently, the OECD, in competition with other IGOs, tends to reformulate 
existing trends and solutions in order to gain political legitimacy in the member states. The 
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OECD is presently preparing to welcome a large number of new member countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe. This will challenge the dominant view and self-perception of the 
OECD as the rich-countries’ club. For all these reasons it has been argued that the OECD is 
currently in an acute identity crisis with its purpose and direction badly understood. 
 
In favor of an intergovernmental dynamic within the OECD secretariat would count the 
organizational affiliation to member states, the de facto recruitment procedures and the low 
degree of institutionalisation. OECD personnel are not formally recruited on basis of their 
country of origin. Ideally, only merit counts in recruitment situations. However, as in most 
other IGOs the recruitment praxis in the OECD Secretariat favors certain nationalities at the 
expense of others. This means that the question of nationality also counts in the framework of 
the OECD. As a general pattern, compared to their budgetary contribution, the big member 
states (France is the significant exception) are underrepresented among the OECD employees 
and the small countries are overrepresented. Overall, however, the size of the member country 
correlates with the number of OECD civil servants with origin in that country.  
 
An additional factor that talks in favor of a distinct intergovernmental dynamic within the 
OECD secretariat is the fact that the average seniority of OECD civil servants only is four 
years. It seems that the average OECD civil servant consider the OECD post as being one step 
among others in a distinct national career since most return to their home countries after 
employment. Given the large number of seconded personnel among the OECD civil servants, 
the short tenure of the average OECD civil servant and the fact that the large majority of 
OECD civil servants are employed on time-limited contracts, one could argue that it is 
possible to define the entire OECD secretariat as a parallel administration in the sense 
described above. Finally, since the OECD secretariat, compared to the European Commission, 
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is not primarily engaged in the production of hard law relatively few standard operating 
procedures and fixed mandates exist in the OECD. The number of directly binding OECD 
decisions and international agreements is low and typically concentrated within very few 
issue areas. The OECD flexibly engages in the collection, transformation and diffusion of 
OECD-wide norms. This it does through various soft-law mechanisms, of which regular peer-
review and surveillance is notorious (Marcussen 2004a). 
 
Other factors, however, may trigger a transgovernmental dynamic within the OECD 
secretariat. In general, the average OECD A-grade civil servant is well educated within his or 
her discipline (Marcussen 2004b). S/he has yearlong professional experience within that 
discipline either from other IGOs or from the country of origin. Furthermore, the OECD civil 
servant will be officially encouraged and rewarded to participate in and contribute to 
international academic conference and scientific journals and reports. A frequently evoked 
reason for working within the OECD secretariat is the possibility of exploiting ones own 
professional curiosity. In this way, OECD civil servants may have developed loyalties 
towards specific issue areas, such as research and trade. 
 
Finally, some factors encourage the development of a supranational dynamic within the 
OECD secretariat. As mentioned, the very raison d’être of the OECD is to make a decisive 
difference for the way national civil servants think and perceive of problems and solutions. 
The OECD itself is in the transformation business, i.e. it is engaged in the construction of 
world-views and perceptions among national civil servants. In some committees and some 
sectors outward-directed socialization practices may be more efficient that in others 
(Marcussen 2004c; Lerdell and Sahlin-Andersson 1997; Sahlin-Andersson 2000). The 
effectiveness of such socialization may depend on the techniques applied by the OECD, such 
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as information, deliberation, and peer-pressure. It may also depend on the extent to which a 
unified and coherent OECD ideology has developed. If it is possible to identify a certain 
OECD-way of doing things it will, everything else being equal, be more likely that learning 
by OECD civil servants is unidirectional, harmonious and goal-directed. An additional factor 
that speaks in favor of supranational dynamics in the OECD secretariat is that fact that the 
OECD secretariat to an increasing extent has developed coherent strategies with regard to 
third countries. Thus, the OECD secretariat, through its multiple outreach activities, is heavily 
engaged with non-member countries with a view to assist, instruct, monitor, survey and 
supervise these (Marcussen forthcoming). Such unified action towards the outside world may 
strengthen the development of a distinct OECD identity. 
 
The WTO Secretariat 
The WTO Secretariat, located in Geneva, has around 550 regular staff and is headed by a 
Director-General. It is horizontally specialized into nineteen functional divisions (much like 
the European Commission), two divisions with information and liaison tasks and three 
divisions with support roles. The Secretariat is vertically specialized and the divisions are 
headed by a Director who reports to a Deputy-Director General or directly to the Director 
General. The Secretariat supports and assists the WTO members during the day-to-day 
operation of the WTO agreements, during dispute settlements, and during trade negotiations. 
The Secretariat’s main duties is to supply technical and professional support for the various 
councils and committees of the WTO, to provide technical assistance to developing countries, 
to monitor and analyze developments in world trade, to provide information to the public and 
the mass media and to organize the ministerial conferences. The Secretariat also provides 
legal assistance in the dispute settlement process and advises governments wishing to become 
members of the WTO.  
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According to WTO’s internal rules, the Secretariat has no formal decision-making power. 
Hence, the Secretariat does not have autonomous supranational authority. However, the 
relatively small Secretariat is involved in most of the work of the WTO and is essential for the 
functioning of the organization. Vacancies are the subject of open competition and advertised 
by means of vacancy notices, the distribution of which is made to all official representatives 
of the WTO. Those attending the secretariat possess post-graduate university degrees with an 
emphasis on trade issues. The academic qualifications are often supplemented by at least five 
years of experience in national governments, IGOs, or other organizations or enterprises 
dealing with issues of trade policy and international trade relations. Thus, the officials have a 
variety of former institutional affiliations. However, the professional staff consists primarily 
of economists and lawyers specialized in international trade policy (www.wto.org). Hence, 
WTO officials have strong sectoral affiliations – reflecting their educational backgrounds and 
their prior employment in other IGOs, enterprises or other organizations as well as in 
domestic sector ministries.  
 
We ask how officials of the WTO Secretariat perceive their own roles as employees of the 
Secretariat. It is assumed that the configuration of different role perceptions evoked by WTO 
officials has consequences for which actors, what kind of information and what networks are 
brought into the WTO decisions. Thus, the behavior and role perceptions of the officials of 
the WTO Secretariat may affect the dynamics of the WTO as a whole. WTO officials are 
recruited from the member-states, but do they perceive themselves to be national 
representatives? They are mainly educated in economy, trade policy and law, but do they 
perceive themselves to be primarily professional experts? They are employed by the WTO 
and are supposed to be loyal to this organization, but do they perceive themselves to be 
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primarily WTO officials? The seminal study of Cox and Jacobson (1973) demonstrated that 
officials with long tenure in IEs developed identifications with it.  
 
Intergovernmental, supranational and transgovernmental roles are not mutually exclusive. On 
the contrary, these roles are likely to play out in different organizational contexts. 
Furthermore, although WTO officials do not have formal decision-making power, they 
nevertheless are important in gathering, administering and processing information. Hence, 
they are important both as premise providers and in preparing decisions made by the member 
states. However, at present there is a lack of empirical observations to illuminate the mix of 
organizational dynamics underpinning the WTO secretariat. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Westphalian logic of territorial sovereignty is challenged more by some IGOs than by 
others. The intergovernmental logic of territoriality seems less salient in the European Union 
than in the OECD and the WTO. However, we cannot conclude that the same pattern is valid 
for the IEs of these organizations. The mix of behavioral and role dynamics within the IEs are 
organizationally contingent and more complex than assumed by IR theoretical orthodoxy. IE 
officials are expected to perform increasingly more complex tasks of representation. The 
organizational approach suggested here has unpacked the organizational components of IEs in 
order to understand their nuts and bolts. Different behavioral logics are played out in the EU 
Commission, the WTO Secretariat and the OECD Secretariat due to different levels of 
institutionalization, different recruitment procedures, different tenure among the IE officials, 
and different organizational affiliations towards external organizations. Nevertheless, due to 
similarities in other internal organizational characteristics (Figure 1), these IEs seem to share 
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important behavioral dynamics. However, faced with a lack of empirical data on IE dynamics 
there is need of a systematic empirical research program to reveal them.  
 
A pertinent question is also how the internal dynamics of IEs affect domestic government 
institutions. What happens when strongly institutionalized domestic executives and strongly 
pre-socialized civil servants become locked into the organizational machinery of IEs? Are we 
indeed witnessing the emergence of a transformative international bureaucracy with an 
autonomous transformational power towards supranationalism and transgovernmentalism? Or 
do we observe merely incremental institutional adjustments within the existing Westphalian 
order of territorial executive governance? Our analysis indicates that IEs are complex and 
multifaceted, marble cake-like organizations with different internal dynamics. The future 
research challenge is to theoretically explicate and empirically document the organizational 
conditions under which different behavioral and role dynamics play out among IE decision-
makers. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 This paper is part of a project entitled “DISC: Dynamics of International Secretariats”. The financial support of 
the Joint Committee of the Nordic Social Science Research Councils is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks to 
Torbjorn Larsson for valuable comments on prior drafts. A previous draft was presented at the 12th. Annual 
Conference in Political Science, Tromsø, Norway, 11-13 January 2004. The authors are indebted to comments 
from the conference participants.  
2 For simplicity reasons, we use the term International Governmental Organization (IGO) to describe the OECD, 
the WTO, as well as the European Union. These three organizations all have nation-states as their members. 
Nevertheless, the European Union in particular is also recognized to be much more than just an 
intergovernmental organization (e.g. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). 
3 Among the puzzling observations is the fact that the volume of institutional change within the European Union 
seems larger than the corresponding volume of institutional change within the member-states (Wessels, Maurer 
and Mittag 2003). Hence, transformational processes at the nation-state level seem imperfectly associated with 
transformational changes at the EU level. 
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